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Article
Introduction
“Deus lo vult,” Latin for “God wills it,” were the words 
with which Pope Urban II called for the First Crusade at 
the Council of Clermont in 1095 (e.g., Horowitz 2009; 
Latham 2011). The bloody Crusades and many other faith-
driven violent incidents demonstrate, to this day, the cru-
cial role of religious leaders in many conflicts. Besides 
religious structures, ideas, and institutions, religious lead-
ers play a key role in mobilizing religious groups (e.g., 
Fox 2013; Toft 2007). Given their legitimacy, credibility, 
and influence with many followers, religious leaders often 
command huge resources for mobilization (Fox 2013, 
85–88) and may be the crucial difference that tips the bal-
ance in the “ambivalence of the sacred” (Appleby 2000). 
They can either call for peace or instigate violence. Recent 
empirical evidence suggests that pro-violence discourse 
by religious leaders contributes to the escalation of reli-
gious conflict (Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2014).
But what makes religious leaders either support peace 
or promote violence? Alongside many case study–oriented 
works, the more systematic literature on religious leaders 
has stressed the role of competition between leaders 
that result in outbidding processes that in turn generate 
extremism (De Juan 2009; Toft 2007). Other scholars have 
focused on group differences and social deprivations on 
which religious or other types of leader can capitalize on 
(Canetti et al. 2010; Hauk and Mueller 2015; Trejo 2009). 
Sociological and psychological survey–based research 
on why people generally countenance violence points to 
demographic variables such as age, gender, and educa-
tion, or to the individual’s personal experiences with 
violence (e.g., Black et al. 2010). However, such personal 
preferences and experiences have almost never been 
tested as alternative explanations for the chosen attitudes 
of religious leaders. Research on the determinants of reli-
gious leaders’ attitudes toward violence has almost never 
used survey polls. Survey-based work on the effects of 
religious attitudes typically deals with ordinary believers 
only, covers few attitudes, and uses political intolerance 
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as the dependent variable rather than violence (e.g., 
Eisenstein 2006).
Drawing on a survey poll of 102 religious leaders in 
Juba, South Sudan, this paper aims to contribute to the 
filling of this knowledge gap. This article provides the 
first attempt to study the attitudes of religious leaders 
toward violence based on an opinion poll in a developing 
country. Measured as the sanctioning of riots as a reaction 
to an offense to Mohammed and/or Jesus, this paper 
analyzes when and why some religious leaders are liable 
to support faith-based violence while others are not. The 
paper looks not only at classical determinants of support 
for violence such as age, gender, education, and previous 
personal experiences with violence, but also at a huge 
number of pertinent religious attitudes and behaviors 
such as tolerance toward other faiths, threat perceptions 
vis-à-vis other groups, and interreligious activities.
Results suggest that support for faith-based violence 
is largely independent from individual demographic 
determinants but is closely related to one’s other religious 
attitudes. Those leaders who embrace secularism and are 
tolerant toward other faiths reject religion-based vio-
lence. The only exception in biographical terms is a 
Muslim identity of leaders. Given the proximity of radi-
cal Islamism in neighboring (North) Sudan and being a 
minority in the sample and in South Sudan, Muslims seem 
to more readily accept faith-based violence—however, 
they also have empathy for the riots of Christians and not 
just those of Muslims. Surprisingly, interreligious activi-
ties do not reduce support for violence although they do 
increase understanding for peaceful protest. We generally 
find evidence that the support of peaceful protests follows 
a different logic than for violent ones. A preliminary 
comparison with laymen suggests that the attitudes of 
leaders and ordinary believers are not the same.
Although we cannot generalize our results beyond the 
case of South Sudan, we believe that they are important 
for the link between religion and conflict in general. This 
paper is the first that systematically employs a combina-
tion of innovative quantitative measures for a wide range 
of relevant religious attitudes of religious leaders—not 
just believers—in the context of a developing country.
Our study also matters for the study of conflict in 
general. Recent empirical evidence suggests that reli-
gion plays a substantial role in a good share of conflicts 
(e.g., Fox 2004; Svensson 2007; Toft 2007). Between 
1990 and 2010, more than 57 percent of armed conflicts 
in developing countries had religious overtones, that is, 
these conflicts were fought between different religious 
groups and/or the warring factions differed by theological 
claims (Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2014).
Our findings are also important for processes of polit-
ical mobilization in general (Fox 2013, 84). Differences 
in the logic of peaceful and violent protest as well as the 
relationship between leaders and followers (e.g., Djupe 
and Gilbert 2003) matter well beyond the relationship of 
religion and violence.
Literature Review
The determinants of religious leaders’ attitudes toward 
violence are derived from at least three strands of litera-
ture. First, we look at the link between religion and con-
flict—including the role of religious leaders therein. We 
then turn to those works that have attempted to explain 
why religious leaders support or call for violence. Finally, 
we take a look at what is known about why people in 
general, and not just leaders, are liable to engage in or 
support violence.
Religion and Conflict
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the link 
between religion and violent conflict has attracted 
increasing scholarly attention (e.g., Toft, Philpott, and 
Shah 2011). A growing body of literature has since 
emerged, mainly investigating religion as a potential 
cause of violence. Almost all works adopt the idea that a 
number of different aspects of religion1 can create the 
necessary opportunity and/or motive to help overcome 
the collective action problems that are faced by those 
individuals trying to perpetrate organized violence (see, 
for example, Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; McAdam, Tarrow, 
and Tilly 2001).
Many quantitative works have investigated the effects 
of several different forms of religious diversity, such as 
fractionalization, polarization, and dominance (of one 
group). Empirical results have been mixed, however, and 
yielded no evidence of robust relationships—possibly 
with the exception of dominance, which more regularly 
seems to increase conflict risks (see, for example, 
Ellingsen 2000; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; 
Rummel 1997). Recent quantitative works have found 
evidence that civil war becomes more likely when reli-
gious cleavages run parallel to divides of income, geog-
raphy, and religion (e.g., Gubler and Selway 2012). 
Akbaba and Taydas (2011) found that religious discrim-
ination by the state against ethnoreligious minorities 
slightly increases the risk of violence (see also Fox, 
James, and Li 2009).
While many case studies show that religious leaders 
can indeed instigate violence, as exemplified by Pope 
Urban II’s call in 1095, there have been to date only a few 
systematic opinion–based studies that have tested this 
relationship directly. In a study on political violence per-
petrated by Jews and Muslims in Israel, Canetti et al. 
(2010) found that relative economic and political depri-
vation results in support for violence only when religious 
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leaders provide an inflammatory interpretation of these 
deprivations. In line with this finding, calls for violence 
might generally increase the risk of widespread conflict 
breaking out (Horowitz 2009; Juergensmeyer 2008).
Determinants of Religious Leaders’ Attitudes 
toward Violence
Research on why religious leaders favor either violence 
or peace in a given situation thus far has mainly relied 
on qualitative works. Frequently, it is either religious 
extremism or peace activism—and not so much violence 
per se—that is explained through these studies (e.g., 
De Juan 2009; Toft 2007).
The basic finding thus far regarding the determinants 
of extremist or belligerent attitudes is that religious lead-
ers do not support violence because of their core personal 
preferences. The literature suggests that religious leaders 
rather incite conflict—and later support violence—only 
when they feel threatened by competitors (e.g., De Juan 
2009; Toft 2007; Trejo 2009). As religious leaders by 
nature try to preserve and also extend their influence, 
they would inevitably compete with other religious lead-
ers for the backing of believers or political leaders when 
the need to do so arises. This competition for influence 
results in outbidding processes that generate extremist 
and aggressive views (see, for example, Toft 2007).
These processes do not occur out of context. Toft 
(2007) emphasizes the role of political leaders in them; 
according to her, close relations between political and 
religious leaders favor violence. Hauk and Mueller (2015) 
and Canetti et al. (2010), meanwhile, point to the sig-
nificance of existing economic or other forms of margin-
alization. Existing group inequalities are an opportunity 
religious leaders can capitalize on to increase their sup-
port base. When marginalized themselves, religious 
leaders are also more prone to embrace extremist views.
All these works also stress the impact of context, but 
they do not focus on personal traits; in fact, the latter have 
almost never been tested with regard to religious leaders. 
As such, little work has investigated the determinants of 
religious leaders’ attitudes toward violence in a quantita-
tive manner and with individual level data. Existing 
survey-based works on the effects of religion on political 
attitudes almost exclusively focus on ordinary believers, 
typically employ only a small selection of religious 
attitudes, and often investigate several forms of political 
intolerance rather than the support of violence. These 
studies find that for the average Western respondent, 
religious fundamentalism is associated with political 
intolerance, ethnocentrism, and militarism, as well as with 
the preference for more violent solutions to political 
problems (e.g., Eisenstein 2006; Rothchild, Abdolhossein, 
and Pyszczynski 2009)
The (few) surveys on leaders have investigated the 
attitudes of protestant religious leaders toward the U.S. 
engagement in the Vietnam War (Quinley 1974) or toward 
domestic violence against women in the United States 
(e.g., Levitt and Ware 2006). To the best of our knowl-
edge, however, there has thus far been only one system-
atic survey poll targeted at religious leaders in developing 
countries. Jeremy Menchik (2013) conducted a survey of 
1,000 Islamic leaders in Indonesia. His questions, how-
ever, did not refer to attitudes directly related to violence 
but rather to religious tolerance; moreover, his results 
have not been published.
General Determinants of Individual’s Support 
for Violence
Violence does not have its origins only in religion. The 
socio-psychological and criminological literature looks at 
a wide range of other reasons why individuals support or 
engage in violence (e.g., Black et al. 2010; Hirschi and 
Hindelang 1977; Bellair and McNulty 2009). Quantitative 
works on the topic are mainly based on surveys covering 
only youths and young adults. The most widely used indi-
cator of violence is self-reported violent action itself, and 
not a propensity for violence per se.
Researchers usually cluster these variables by differ-
entiating between demographic (e.g., age gender, race, 
socioeconomic status) and personal measures (e.g., 
family background, impulsivity). Robust correlates of 
violence are a number of demographic characteristics 
such as age, gender, and socioeconomic status (e.g., 
education, social status, occupation). Younger males 
from more disadvantaged social backgrounds are more 
prone to supporting violence.
Besides demography, one’s specific personal life expe-
rience is also robustly linked to more violent behavior. 
The nature of one’s family background, and especially 
prior exposure to violence within the family environment, 
increases the risk of an individual later becoming favor-
able to violence (e.g., Black et al. 2010). Lower levels 
of education and intelligence also increase the risk of an 
individual engaging in violent activities (e.g., Hirschi 
and Hindelang 1977). In addition, the neighborhood one 
inhabits, discrimination, gang membership, and the abuse 
of alcohol and other substances also count (Bellair and 
McNulty 2009). Another (classical) strand of the literature 
deals with authoritarianism and closed mindedness and 
how these traits relate to dogmatism and intolerance 
(Adorno et al. 1950; Rokeach 1960). Although these 
studies do not focus on violence, one can assume that 
intolerance and violence are closely related.
In sum, previous research has clearly underscored that 
religious leaders are important in the outbreak of reli-
gious and other forms of conflict. We have also seen that 
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works that investigate the determinants of religious lead-
ers’ attitudes toward violence or actual violent behavior 
have almost never tested individual level data—despite 
opinion survey–based research having identified personal 
traits, attitudes, and experiences as important determi-
nants thereof.
Theoretical Argument and 
Hypotheses
Theoretically, we combine two strands of the literature: 
research on the general individual determinants of vio-
lence and research on the determinants of pro-violence 
attitudes among religious leaders. As a theoretical start-
ing point, we assume that religious leaders are not too 
different from ordinary human beings. As such, their atti-
tudes toward violence will, either way, be no different 
from those of other individuals. We hence hypothesize 
that classical demographic and biographical characteris-
tics will shape the likelihood of religious leaders support-
ing violence. Younger males are, accordingly, more prone 
to favor violence. Higher levels of education and having 
spent some time outside of one’s own country will widen 
the individual’s horizons and empathy with other beliefs, 
cultures, and nationalities. Better educated people usually 
tend to hold antiviolence norms and can anticipate better 
the harmful consequences of aggressive actions (e.g., 
Hirschi and Hindelang 1977). The contact hypothesis 
(Sherif et al. 1961) expects that being familiar with other 
cultures decreases the likelihood of conflict. Finally, 
one’s personal experience with violence will also affect 
their attitude toward the use of faith-based forms of it. We 
follow here the findings from the literature that personal 
experience with violence will increase a propensity for it 
(e.g., Black et al. 2010). In sum, with regard to the demo-
graphic and biographical features of individuals, we 
hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1; demography): Religious leaders 
will support violence more readily when they are (1) 
younger and (2) male.
Hypothesis 2 (H2; biography): Religious leaders 
will support violence more readily when they have (1) 
lower levels of education, (2) not spent time abroad, 
and (3) personally experienced violence themselves.
It may however also be true that religious leaders are 
special members of the community. They undergo spe-
cialized training in theological issues, they are probably 
more reflective individuals than the average citizen, and, 
arguably, faith plays a much bigger role in their lives than 
it does in those of ordinary people and laymen. In this 
context, it may become crucial what kind of attitudes 
these leaders hold vis-à-vis faith-related issues besides 
those on violence. Generally, we believe that more 
intolerant views with regard to other religious faiths or 
the order of the state will also be accompanied by 
greater support for violence in principle (see, for exam-
ple, Adorno et al. 1950; Rothchild, Abdolhossein, and 
Pyszczynski 2009). Intolerant and more violence-
favoring views can take several different forms. Rejecting 
a secular constitution may signify that a leader thinks that 
his (or her) faith is superior to other beliefs—or that 
nonreligious (atheist or agnostic) views are inferior. 
Threat perceptions vis-à-vis other (religious) groups may 
fuel greater support for violence as well. The individual 
who feels threatened is more likely to take up arms in 
what they believe is self-defense. In sum, we hypothesize 
that one or all of a number of religious attitudes increase 
the support for violence:
Hypothesis 3 (H3; religious attitudes): Religious 
leaders will support violence more readily when they 
hold other intolerant and hostile views on interreligious 
relations and other faiths such as (1) rejecting a secular 
constitution, (2) intolerance toward members of other 
faiths, or (3) threat perceptions vis-à-vis other groups.
Attitudes are different from experiences and behaviors. 
Drawing again on the “contact hypothesis” (Sherif et al. 
1961), but directly related to interreligious activities and 
not just intercultural experience, many scholars and practi-
tioners (e.g., Smock 2002) assume that religious leaders—
being probably no different from ordinary believers—will 
be less supportive of violence when they have had more 
prior experience and interaction with people from other 
denominations or generally view these activities positively. 
Such contact will undermine stereotypes and prejudices. 
Knowing people personally and being ready to cooperate 
with them make it less easy to countenance violence 
against them. We thus assume as follows:
Hypothesis 4 (H4; interreligious activity): Religious 
leaders will support violence more readily when they 
lack experience with and hold positive views of inter-
religious activities.
A final hypothesis deals with religious identity. It is, of 
course, politically sensitive to make assumptions about 
the role of one’s Muslim identity in his or her relationship 
to violence. Generally, we are not in favor of an essential-
ist notion of Islam—or of any other religious tradition 
for that matter. Christianity, Islam, or any other religious 
belief—with the possible exception of Satanism—is not 
inherently either violent or peaceful. We believe rather 
that the use of religious ideas for violence or peace 
depends on specific social circumstances. When radical 
discourse and faith-based violence are more prevalent in a 
given country or community, the approval for those prac-
tices will increase. More precisely, these circumstances in 
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South Sudan exist in the context of an Islamist regime in 
(Northern) Sudan. Many Muslim leaders in Southern 
Sudan have a Northern background—something also 
revealed by our own survey data. The Northern Sudanese 
government draws inspiration from extremist Islamism 
and has engaged in faith-based violence. One such pursuit 
has been the organization of violent riots, for instance, 
against the Danish Mohammed cartoons. Muslims also 
form a minority in South Sudan, possibly making them 
more sensitive to religious insults and/or threat percep-
tions. Many minorities radicalize under these circum-
stances. In sum, these considerations make us believe in 
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 (H5; religious identity): (South 
Sudanese) Muslim religious leaders will support riots 
more readily than other religious leaders.
Data and Empirical Strategy
Religion and the Case of South Sudan
The empirical basis of this study is a survey poll that was 
conducted in October 2012 in Juba, South Sudan. This 
study is not per se so much about South Sudan, which 
rather serves as an example for the relationship between 
religious leaders and their attitudes to violence in general.
However, we should give a brief overview of the role 
of religion in South Sudan and its relation to conflict 
there. Most South Sudanese people are Christians or 
adherents to African Traditional Religions (ATRs). It is 
perhaps a defining feature of religion in the country that 
these traditions often mix; South Sudanese Christendom 
is constituted by a syncretic Christianity. Muslims are a 
minority in the country. These individuals are over-
whelmingly Sunni Muslim; many have a Northern back-
ground and have their roots in what is now (Northern) 
Sudan. The Pew Research Center (Pew Forum 2012) 
estimated that in 2010, 60.5 percent of the population 
were Christian, 32.9 percent were followers of ATR, and 
6.2 percent were Muslim.
Neither South Sudan nor Juba is a hotspot of religious 
conflict. Faith-based violence has been minimal; reli-
gious leaders and organizations there have, rather, made 
efforts to address the various intercommunal conflicts 
that broke out (see Agwanda and Harris 2009; Breidlid 
and Stensland 2011)—such as between Nuer and Dinka.2
The rather moderate role of religion within South 
Sudan makes it particularly worthwhile to study the 
determinants of support for violence in this location—a 
place where religious radicalism is not a dominant force. 
Before its independence, however, South Sudan had a 
highly conflictive relationship with Northern Sudan in 
which the Christian-Animist Southern part faced off 
against the Muslim North. This conflict had pronounced 
religious overtones to it (see, for example, Toft 2007). 
Northern efforts to dominate South Sudan also included 
the imposition of Sharia law on the whole country. In the 
midst of the violence of the decade-long Northern aggres-
sion and the Southern upsurge, religion provided some 
sense and solace for the afflicted population. Beyond 
the spiritual refuge provided, the Christian churches were 
also among the few institutions to provide basic services 
such as health care, education, shelter, and food for the 
suffering population. The strong social role that the 
church played during the civil war has since persisted in 
South Sudan. Religion thus continues to be an integral 
part of daily life for the South Sudanese (Agwanda and 
Harris 2009).
In sum, we do not claim that South Sudan is a repre-
sentative or “crucial” case for the study of the relation-
ship between religion and violence. However, we argue 
that South Sudan is not a bad choice either. While the 
civil war in unified Sudan had strong religious overtones, 
we do not find an unusual amount of religious extremism 
in independent South Sudan. It thus represents rather a 
hard than an easy case for our hypotheses and might 
therefore be particularly suited to study the relationship.
The Sample
Juba is the capital of Africa’s youngest independent 
state, South Sudan, having an estimated 370,000 inhab-
itants. Unfortunately, at the time of our field research, 
there were no lists or registers of religious leaders 
available that could serve as sampling frames. As an 
alternative, we decided in collaboration with our survey 
firm Pechter Polls Princeton and their local partner to 
select religious leaders on the basis of a catch-all prin-
ciple. In total, our sample comprises 102 religious leaders 
(including imams, bishops, pastors, and deacons) from 
Juba, and thus represents a ratio of 1 religious leader 
per 3,627 inhabitants. While our sample probably failed 
to cover every last religious leader in Juba, we are con-
fident that it does a sufficiently good job of representing 
the majority of religious leadership within the South 
Sudanese capital. For the purpose of cross-validating 
the representativeness of our sample, we compared the 
per capita coverage per religious leader with figures for 
Catholic priests per Catholic believer in other sub-Saha-
ran African nations. Drawing on figures published on 
the Catholic-hierarchy.org website, we calculate that in 
the DR Congo, one Catholic priest serves 6,800 Catholic 
believers. In Nigeria this figure is 4,000, in Kenya 
4,200, in Cameroon 3,050, and in Ghana 2,500. In very 
rough terms, we are able to say that the inhabitants-to-
religious leaders ratio in our Juba sample presents a 
reasonable figure for convincingly claiming that we 
have likely caught the majority of religious leaders living 
in Juba.
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We included exclusively Muslim and Christian reli-
gious leaders. The following cross-table below (Table 1) 
describes our total sample of 102 religious leaders along 
three key dimensions: religious affiliation, gender, and 
age group. It shows that 87 respondents were Christian, 
of which only 7 were women, and 15 were Muslim. 
Although these figures suggest a bias toward male, 
Christian religious leaders, we believe that our sample 
reasonably represents the real distribution of religious 
leaders in Juba (and elsewhere). As mentioned above, 6.2 
percent of the South Sudanese population are estimated 
to be Muslim, with possibly higher numbers in the major 
towns where international trade is often in the hands of 
Muslims. Hence, around 15 percent Muslim respondents 
appears to be an equitable figure. With regard to women 
as Christian religious leaders, we hold that 7 percent is 
probably a quite realistic share as well.
Respondents were interviewed by local enumerators, 
as the presence of white, Western foreigners would prob-
ably have had an effect on the contents of interviews. 
Local partners reported no irregularities during the inter-
views. The questionnaire used comprises twenty-eight 
items divided into demographic and biographical sec-
tions, as well as ones on attitudes toward religious affairs 
as well as toward conflict (see Table 1A in the online 
appendix at http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/). 
Some items combine attitudes toward conflict and reli-
gion. We will elaborate on detailed items in the question-
naire in the next subsection, wherein we also outline the 
operationalization of our main variables.
Operationalization of Key Variables
We decided to indirectly ask the respondents about 
their attitudes toward violence, the dependent variable. 
Respondent were given two hypothetical situations in 
which either Christians or Muslims riot as a reaction to a 
religiously charged insult (“Christians riot as a reaction to 
an insult against Jesus”; “Muslims riot as a reaction to an 
insult against Prophet Muhammad”). The questionnaire 
also included a similar pair of questions in which there 
were explicitly peaceful protests instead of riots. 
Respondents could assess their approval for all of these 
(four) hypothetical situations on a scale ranging from 1 to 
7, where 7 meant that the riots/protests were understand-
able and 1 that they were not at all justifiable. We have to 
clarify here that we asked about a hypothetical situation, 
not about actual rioting in South Sudan, as—to the best of 
our knowledge—no faith-related riots have occurred in 
South Sudan. The indirect manner of the questioning was 
intentional, and is a standard approach for addressing and 
avoiding the distortive effects that arise due to social 
desirability. Direct questions about one’s personal readi-
ness to engage in violence are not considered valid items 
in such surveys (e.g., Tourangeau and Yan 2007).
On the basis of this information, we created three vari-
ables for the attitude toward violence harbored. The main 
dependent variable combines the extent of support for 
both situations (total_riot). Two other variables take into 
account the religious identity of the respondent and 
whether it is Christians or Muslims who are rioting. The 
second dependent variable (own_riot) captures to what 
extent respondents approved of riots when their “own” 
religious groups were insulted. For instance, we asked 
whether Christian clerics supported rioting as a reaction 
to an offense against Jesus. The third variable measures to 
what extent respondents approved of riots by another reli-
gious group (other_riot). Three equivalent variables were 
created for the peaceful protests.
In descriptive terms a majority of respondents com-
pletely disapproved of riots—57 percent, 64 percent, and 
61 percent, respectively, for the three variables discussed 
above. However, the dependent variable nevertheless 
meaningfully distinguishes the respondents from each 
other: Between 16 percent and 18 percent of respondents 
signaled their understanding when people riot, with 
between 9 percent and 13 percent giving the highest pos-
sible level of approval for such reactions. The distribution 
of these and all following variables is presented in the 
violin plots of Figure 1 below.3
As the questionnaire contains many different items 
(see Appendix Table A2) we reduced the number of inde-
pendent variables to include only the most important 
ones. Key demographic and biographical variables such 
as age, gender (female), and level of education (educa-
tion) were included to measure H1 and H2. We also 
included two variables on whether respondents had previ-
ously spent some time abroad (studied/lived abroad) or 
had had personal experience with violence, to opera-
tionalize H2 (personal violence). The latter was captured 
through two questions. One asked for personal threats or 
attacks directed toward the respondent (none, once, more 
than once), the other whether any family members had 
previously been killed. We combined the two scores in a 
simple additive logic, resulting in a value between 0 and 
Table 1. Cross-Tabulation of Key Characteristics of the 
Sample (N = 102).
Age
Religious affiliation and gender
Christian Muslim
Male Female Male Female
Under 18 — — — —
18–25 1 1 — —
26–35 15 2 1 —
36–45 33 1 5 —
Above 45 31 3 9 —
Total 80 7 15 —
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3. Zero indicates that neither the respondent nor his or her 
family members were attacked or threatened, 3 means 
that a family member was killed and the respondent was 
threatened more than once.4
For testing H3 (religious attitudes), we used a combina-
tion of innovative items on religious attitudes. Secularism 
(prefer secular constitution) was measured through the 
level of approval given to the statement, “School curri-
cula and the constitution should mention religion respect-
fully but otherwise be secular and not give priority to any 
specific religious viewpoint over another.” Religious tol-
erance toward other faiths was captured through several 
different statements (additionally identified by factor 
analysis) on how a democratic society should treat reli-
gious deviance such as atheism or polytheism or mem-
bership in minority religious groups. We also asked to 
what extent religious leaders have contributed to peace in 
a number of particular South Sudanese conflicts,5 as we 
assume that people who see a peace potential in religion 
will also be less tolerant of faith-based violence. The 
fourth measure of H3 was threat perceptions vis-à-vis 
other religious groups. Respondents were asked to imag-
ine a situation in which several drunk young men were 
crossing their path. The item included several options 
regarding the religious social identity of these men, 
including Christian, nonbeliever, or Muslim. Respondents 
then had to assess to what extent they would be scared of 
these individuals, also estimating their likely level of fear 
for each group separately.
H4 tests the role of interreligious peace activities in 
mitigating violence. We had several items that covered 
this eventuality. One direct question on experience with 
interreligious, ecumenical training had to be dropped as it 
did not meaningfully distinguish the respondents from 
each other—almost all of those interviewed had under-
gone such training. Instead, we again used the approval 
for hypothetical situations such as joint demonstrations of 
religious groups for democracy and peace. To test H5 on 
Muslim versus Christian identity, we simply employed the 
respondent’s self-reported—and mostly self-evident—
religious identity (Muslim).
Estimation Technique
Our dependent variables are seven-point Likert-type 
scaled measures of attitudes to faith-based violence. Such 
measures can be treated as interval-scaled variables, and 
we therefore use a linear model.6 Since we employ cross-
sectional data and cannot exclude problems of reverse 
causality, our approach has limitations regarding its 
potential to find causal relationships in the strict sense. 
We ran several robustness checks using alternative mod-
els, samples, and specifications; these checks we describe 
in the course of this subsection. In addition, Table A14 in 
the online appendix shows the response patterns between 
the dependent variable total_riot and the independent 
variables.
Muslim
Interreligious peace activities
Threat perceptions
Peace potential
Religious tolerance
Prefer secular constitution
Personal violence
Studied/lived abroad
Education
Female
Age
Other_riot
Own_riot
Total_riot
0 2 4 6 8
Figure 1. Violin plots of variables.
For each variable, the violin plot shows the range of values (left–right end points), the median (white dot), and the distribution of the values. 
For instance, the first variable total_riot has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum of 7; its median lies at 1, and it is positively skewed. The visual 
presentation needs to be read with caution, however. Although total_riot (and other variables) appears to have hardly any variation, at least 
visually, the actual values are more diverse (see discussion in the text).
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Results
The results of the multivariate ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression can be detected from Table 2. The first 
finding is that we have almost no support for H1 (demog-
raphy) which assumes that younger males are more likely 
to support violence. Although being older consistently 
reduces the likelihood of having a pro-violence attitude, it 
never reaches conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance. Being female is positively associated with support 
for violence. The reason for this result is probably partly 
rooted in the peculiarities of the sample or of the group as 
such, as it—inevitably—included many more older men 
and fewer women, only seven, and few young men. Only 
two respondents were below twenty-five years of age.
H2 (biography) does not receive more support than 
H1 (demography) either. Neither experience outside the 
country nor higher levels of education or personal experi-
ence with violence explain the divergence in views on the 
legitimacy of riots. This low explanatory power might 
again be explained by the specifics of the sample, as only 
13 percent were never attacked or threatened and only 18 
percent reported that no family members had previously 
been killed. H3 (attitudes) receives substantial but uneven 
support. All four measures—secularism, tolerance, threat 
perceptions, and beliefs in the peace potential—are 
significant in at least one model, and all reduce the like-
lihood of giving support to faith-based violence. Two 
variables—support for a secular constitution and toler-
ance toward other faiths—stand out. The substantive 
effect of both variables is considerable. A one unit change 
on the seven-point Likert-type scale is associated with up 
to a 0.4 decrease on the same-scaled dependent variable. 
Apparently, disapproval of violence in religious affairs is 
strongly correlated to less extremist views in other areas. 
Leaders who accept that their faith is no better than that 
of others are also less likely to assume that violence can 
be used as a legitimate response to a religious insult.
H4 (interreligious activities), meanwhile, must be 
rejected. Participating in more interreligious peace activ-
ities does not reduce the individual’s propensity for 
violence. Perhaps interreligious activities cannot help in 
cases with extreme violence (in the Sudanese civil war) 
until much more time goes by. Finally, H5 (religious 
identity) enjoys substantial support. According to our 
results, Muslim clerics are much more likely to accept the 
use of violence than their Christian counterparts are. The 
dichotomous variable Muslim is significant at the 0.1 per-
cent level and its substantive effect is large. Keeping 
other variables constant, being a Muslim religious leader 
Table 2. OLS Regression Results on Support for Faith-Based Riots.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
H1: Age −0.0312 −0.0490 0.0591 −0.148 −0.0276 −0.0308 −0.207 −0.0312 −0.148
(0.326) (0.311) (0.298) (0.326) (0.326) (0.330) (0.316) (0.288) (0.280)
H1: Female 0.0788 0.286 0.0931 0.381 0.109 0.170 0.367 0.482 0.634
(0.824) (0.587) (0.855) (0.794) (0.806) (0.837) (0.791) (0.669) (0.580)
H2: Education 0.202 0.205 0.170 0.334 0.215 0.214 0.0537 0.285 0.108
(0.335) (0.328) (0.330) (0.296) (0.327) (0.330) (0.248) (0.277) (0.208)
H2: Studied/lived abroad −0.0822 −0.246 −0.102 0.211 0.0316 −0.0621 0.289 0.137 0.357
(0.478) (0.418) (0.437) (0.457) (0.482) (0.485) (0.368) (0.383) (0.303)
H2: Personal violence −0.160 −0.0285 0.0345 −0.193 −0.102 −0.0868 −0.208 0.163 0.145
(0.185) (0.172) (0.209) (0.200) (0.192) (0.188) (0.191) (0.205) (0.202)
H3: Prefer secular constitution −0.400** −0.305† −0.332*
 (0.146) (0.156) (0.140)
H3: Religious tolerance −0.276* −0.334** −0.261**
 (0.109) (0.103) (0.0927)
H3: Peace potential −0.416** −0.356** −0.146
 (0.125) (0.135) (0.106)
H3: Threat perceptions −0.177 −0.205 −0.275†
 (0.149) (0.156) (0.147)
H4: Interreligious peace activities −0.141 0.101 0.0506
 (0.166) (0.198) (0.203)
H5: Muslim 2.980*** 2.581***
 (0.676) (0.564)
Constant 2.167 4.319* 2.452 3.217† 2.751 2.736 2.748† 5.315** 5.796***
(1.879) (2.045) (1.785) (1.730) (1.958) (2.039) (1.593) (1.751) (1.338)
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
Adjusted R2 −.042 .080 .019 .074 −.034 −.044 .232 .225 .411
Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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is associated with a 2.6 points higher score on the depen-
dent variable. It is also worth noting that the adjusted 
r2 statistic increases considerably from models 8 to 9 in 
Table 1 when introducing the Muslim variable, thus 
increasing the explanatory power of the model.
This result has to be put into perspective. We do not 
want to give the misleading impression that we think that 
Islam is by nature more disposed to violence than other 
faiths are. As already noted above, we do not believe in 
essentialist notions of particular faiths. Islam, as with 
Christianity or other faiths, consists of huge and dynamic 
multifaceted clusters of ideas and people behind them. 
These faiths are not distinct and clear-cut phenomena. All 
religious and theological ideas are subject to interpreta-
tion and, dependent on specific circumstances, at times 
violence may have a bigger role in and for some religious 
groups than it does in and for others.
Applied to Islam in South Sudan, our result comes 
then as little surprise. Islam in previously unified Sudan 
had a pronounced fundamentalist streak to it; the hypo-
thetical riots described in our questionnaire had actual 
precedents. As discussed, the Islamist regime in Northern 
Sudan did actually previously organize riots in response 
to the Mohammed cartoons. Moreover, most of the 
Muslim leaders in South Sudan have a Northern back-
ground. As also noted above, Muslims are a minority in 
South Sudan and Northern Muslims were the adversaries 
of Christian-Animist Southerners in the civil war in then 
unified Sudan. As a result, Muslim clerics might be more 
anxious and hence more liable to support violence in 
reaction to an offense.
As our dependent variables were positively skewed 
and even after various transformations their residuals did 
not exactly feature a normal distribution, we ran addi-
tional logistic regressions for the robustness of the results. 
For this purpose, we transformed the dependent variables 
into dummies where 1 captures all those respondents with 
a value higher than 6—in other words, all those highly 
supportive of faith-based violence (maximum level). 
Results are available in the online appendix. By and 
large, the results correspond to the OLS regressions (see 
Appendix Tables A3 and A13). The preference for a 
secular constitution is negatively significant in all mod-
els and even increases its statistical significance in the 
full model. Religious tolerance has a negative effect and 
is statistically significant, and therefore, is also robust 
when compared with the OLS results. The explanatory 
power of the binary variable Muslim remains robust as 
well. However, there are a few differences. In some, but 
not all, models of the logistic regressions in Table A3, 
personal violence increases the support for riots and is 
statistically significant. The variable peace potential, 
partially significant in the OLS models, loses its statistical 
significance.
We also performed tests with alternative operational-
izations of the dependent variable (see Table 3 and 
Appendix Tables A4 to A7). We first took a look at how 
people assess rioting by their own group or another group. 
With a grain of salt, these results confirm the findings 
from the main variable total_riots. H1, H2, and H4 on 
demography, biography, and interreligious activities can-
not be supported, while H3 and H5 on religious attitudes 
and religious identity receive strong support. With H3, it is 
religious tolerance that is consistently significant; secular 
views have no significant influence on own_riots. In gen-
eral, there is evidence for an in-group bias. Interestingly, 
Muslims support riots not only by their own kind but also 
almost equally by Christians.
The picture changes when we take a look at peaceful 
protests. As shown by Table 3, H1 and H2 (demography 
and biography) are rejected again while secularism is no 
longer significant. Religious tolerance changes the sign—
that is, the direction of the relationship. More tolerance 
yields more empathy for peaceful protest, although this is 
only significant for peaceful protests in general and pro-
tests by one’s own group; support for protests by others 
is less pronounced. Threat perceptions vis-à-vis other 
groups also change the direction of the relationship and 
become positive, but remain insignificant. Interreligious 
peace activities become robustly significant, regardless 
of who is protesting. Apparently, interreligious activities 
increase understanding regarding peaceful protest (but 
not riots). Interestingly, the Muslim dummy only barely 
reaches statistical significance in explaining understand-
ing for their own kind’s peaceful protests, but not for 
peaceful protests in general or for other groups. If any-
thing, Muslim leaders do apparently appreciate peaceful 
protest but only as relates to their own group.
Moreover, we performed an additional test with a 
sample of sixty-six laymen, all active in their religious 
communities, who were also asked to fill out the ques-
tionnaire. We admit that the sample is small and respon-
dents were less carefully selected than the clerics were. 
However, the results are remarkably different compared 
with the results for the sample with the leaders (see Table 
A9 in the online appendix). In particular, we find that lay-
men have less different attitudes toward the support of 
peaceful and violent protest. When laymen support secu-
larism and religious tolerance, they equally tend to reject 
violent and peaceful protest while secularly oriented and 
tolerant religious leaders support peaceful protest and 
only reject riots. In addition, the effect of a Muslim iden-
tity on the support of riots (and protest) is much weaker 
for laymen than for leaders—supporting the view that the 
Northern origin of most of the Muslim clerics may 
explain why they tend to support violence.
These preliminary findings have important theoretical 
implications and are, at least, compatible with the idea 
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that the views of religious leaders as regards peace and 
violence do not simply reflect those of their followers—
and hence must be analyzed separately to understand pro-
cesses of mobilization of “ordinary” members of religious 
and other communities (see Djupe and Gilbert 2003).7
In sum, the robustness checks increase our confidence 
in the validity of our main results. Pro-violence views are 
closely related to other religious attitudes, mainly toler-
ance toward others faiths; religious identity also plays a 
role but certainly only in connection with specific historic 
contexts; determinants for a violent or peaceful reaction 
to religious offenses are distinct, confirming that choices 
to back peaceful or violent protests follow different logics 
respectively. We also have preliminary evidence that the 
views of leaders and followers are not identical.
Conclusion
Religious leaders likely play a key role in mobilizing 
believers as they can call for peace or instigate violence. 
But what makes religious leaders support either peace or 
violence? Drawing on a survey poll of 102 religious lead-
ers in Juba, South Sudan, this paper is virtually the first 
attempt to study this topic in a more systematic manner in 
a developing country. The paper has analyzed when and 
why some religious leaders are liable to support faith-
based violence—measured as the approval of riots as a 
reaction to an offense to Mohammed and/or Jesus—while 
others are not. The paper has looked at a unique combina-
tion of classical determinants of support for violence such 
as age, gender, education, and one’s personal experience 
with violence, as well as a wide range of pertinent reli-
gious attitudes and behaviors such as tolerance toward 
other faiths, threat perceptions vis-à-vis other groups, as 
well as interreligious activities.
Our results suggest that the support for faith-based 
violence is largely independent of individual demo-
graphic and biographical determinants but is closely 
related to other religious attitudes. Those leaders who 
embrace secularism and are tolerant of other faiths reject 
religion-based violence—and vice versa. Surprisingly, 
interreligious activities do not reduce the support for vio-
lence but do at least increase understanding for peaceful 
protest (by others). Other demographic and biographical 
determinants do not make a difference either, with one 
exception: Muslim clerics seem to be more ready to sup-
port faith-based violence, probably because of two spe-
cific contextual reasons rather than by a notion of Islam 
Table 3. Regression Results on Positive Attitudes toward Faith-Based Riots and Peaceful Protests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 total_riot own_riot other_riot total_peaceful own_peaceful other_peaceful
H1: Age −0.148 −0.183 −0.113 −0.339 −0.334 −0.343
(0.280) (0.290) (0.287) (0.260) (0.277) (0.269)
H1: Female 0.634 0.975 0.294 −1.121 −0.924 −1.318†
(0.580) (0.699) (0.524) (0.765) (0.854) (0.724)
H2: Education 0.108 0.134 0.0823 −0.0959 −0.121 −0.0704
(0.208) (0.196) (0.258) (0.323) (0.349) (0.333)
H2: Studied/lived abroad 0.357 0.271 0.443 −0.112 −0.299 0.0741
(0.303) (0.306) (0.361) (0.306) (0.274) (0.427)
H2: Personal violence 0.145 0.409† −0.120 0.195 0.368 0.0222
(0.202) (0.210) (0.247) (0.268) (0.319) (0.287)
H3: Prefer secular Constitution −0.332* −0.193 −0.471** −0.121 −0.0129 −0.229
(0.140) (0.141) (0.161) (0.146) (0.162) (0.155)
H3: Religious tolerance −0.261** −0.248** −0.275** 0.218† 0.236* 0.200
(0.0927) (0.0912) (0.104) (0.112) (0.112) (0.122)
H3: Peace potential −0.146 −0.140 −0.152 −0.291 −0.247 −0.336†
(0.106) (0.103) (0.126) (0.181) (0.174) (0.200)
H3: Threat perceptions −0.275† −0.286† −0.264 0.140 0.0946 0.186
(0.147) (0.146) (0.175) (0.169) (0.172) (0.200)
H4: Interreligious peace activities 0.0506 −0.0155 0.117 0.592** 0.508* 0.676**
(0.203) (0.220) (0.215) (0.195) (0.229) (0.204)
H5: Muslim 2.581*** 3.170*** 1.993*** 0.748 1.291† 0.204
(0.564) (0.622) (0.578) (0.613) (0.658) (0.661)
Constant 5.796*** 4.698** 6.895*** 2.685 2.337 3.033
(1.338) (1.387) (1.622) (1.775) (1.984) (1.969)
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
Adjusted R2 .411 .412 .376 .262 .295 .192
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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being inherently violent. First, radical Islamism is prom-
inent in Northern Sudan, and most of the clerics have 
a Northern biographical background. Second, Muslims 
form a minority in the country and minority status leads 
to threat perceptions which make a fertile ground for 
radical attitudes—as we know from many other religious 
and ethnic minorities, also in Western countries.
Generally, however, the study supports the idea that 
pro-violence attitudes among religious leaders mainly 
depend on personal convictions. The paper also shows 
that their support for peaceful or violent protest follow 
different logics respectively. We have preliminary evi-
dence that the views of leaders and laymen differ regard-
ing the support of faith-based violence.
While our results are only a first step, we claim 
that our findings matter beyond the case of South Sudan: 
First, the paper contributes in several ways to the study of 
religion and violence in general. Religious leaders are 
important for conflict dynamics, and a survey-based 
study of religious elites’ attitudes toward (faith-based) 
violence in the context of a developing country had been 
lacking. Previous studies focus on ordinary believers and 
tolerance rather than leaders and violence. The paper also 
employs a unique combination of partially innovative 
measures of a wide range of religious attitudes and other 
characteristics. Some results run counter previous find-
ings and expectations—for instance, that interreligious 
activities are not a universal remedy for problematic 
interfaith relations.
Second, our study is relevant beyond a specialized 
debate on religion and conflict. As already argued, reli-
gion has apparently become more important for conflict 
in general. Some works estimate that around half of all 
armed conflicts have religious overtones (e.g., Basedau, 
Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2014; Svensson 2007). As a conse-
quence, the religion–violence nexus forms an important 
part in the field of peace and conflict studies per se. 
Moreover, some of our study’s implications are important 
for research on processes of political mobilization in 
general (see Fox 2013). Differences between the support 
for violent and peaceful protest as well as differences 
between the attitudes of leaders and ordinary group mem-
bers clearly matter beyond the role of religious leaders in 
mobilization and conflict processes.
Despite the pioneering nature of this study, its signifi-
cant results, and implications, however, many caveats and 
imperatives for future research remain: First, although it 
was not our intention to write an article about the role of 
religion in South Sudan, the results may still need further 
contextualization. Second, our sample may have certain 
shortcomings, specifically as there is a strong Christian 
bias and some results may stem from South Sudanese 
peculiarities. Therefore, our findings need to be replicated 
in other settings and with larger samples. The latter, if 
possible, should be based on a more solid sampling 
strategy in conventional terms, regardless of how difficult 
this might be in practice in developing countries like 
South Sudan.
Other imperfections of our survey and questionnaire 
can also be avoided in future research: for instance, schol-
ars should include items that directly capture competition 
between religious leaders. Such competition is a chief 
variable in the literature but was not measured in this 
study. It would be interesting to compare attitudes of reli-
gious and political leaders. The role of institutions also 
deserves further scrutiny. Recent evidence suggests that 
local religious institutions may have a pacifying effect 
(De Juan, Pierskalla, and Vüllers 2015). We have also 
seen that our rather crude dummy variable for Muslim 
religious leaders explained a substantial part of the vari-
ance. Disaggregating the Muslim/Christian dichotomy 
into more nuanced categories and dimensions may yield 
further worthwhile—and more accurate—insights.
Generally, the relationship between leaders and 
followers of communities deserves closer inspection. 
We have assumed that leaders influence supporters. The 
reverse may hold true as well; most likely, complex 
interactions occur that deserve further inspection. In that 
regard, structural equation models could be used to 
improve the analysis. We also have to think about the 
difference between attitudes and actual action, in particu-
lar, the specific circumstances that transform thoughts 
into deed. In sum, there are huge opportunities for better 
understanding violence awaiting researchers in this field 
and the study of conflict in general. The preferences and 
behaviors of religious leaders matter for violence and 
mobilization processes, and it is extremely important to 
know as much about them as possible.
Supplemental Material
Supplementary material and replication data to this article 
can be viewed at http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/data/when-
religious-leaders-support-faith-based-violence. The usual 
caveat applies.
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Notes
1. “Religion” is notoriously difficult to define. According to 
Toft (2007, 99), definitions “typically include some or all 
of the following elements: a belief in a supernatural being 
(or beings); . . a view that explains both the world as a 
whole and a person’s proper role in it; a code of conduct in 
line with that worldview; and, a community bound by its 
adherence to these elements.”
2. The major civil war that broke out in December 2013 
is said to have been fought along ethnic lines—in other 
words, between Dinka (government) and Nuer (rebels; 
Koos and Gutschke 2014).
3. Because of space restrictions, descriptive summary statis-
tics are shown in Table A1 in the online appendix (http://
prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/). Furthermore, we show 
plots of religious leaders’ opinions on faith-based violence 
(total_riot) and peaceful protests (total_peaceful) disag-
gregated by religious affiliation, gender, and age group 
(see Figures A1 and A2 in the online appendix.
4. We provide a cross-tabulation of the two constituent vari-
ables in Table A11 in the online appendix. Seventy-four 
(out of the ninety-seven) respondents have lost a family 
member as well as experienced violence personally. In 
Table A12, we test our standard regression model with all 
three violence variables (personally attacked, family mem-
ber killed, and the index variable). In none of these models 
are any of these variables significant. The results remain 
robust across all three models.
5. These conflicts were between the Dinka and the Murle; 
between the South Sudanese government and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA); with the Arrow Boys; in Upper 
Nile; in Abyei; in Wun Lit between the Dinka and Nuer; 
between Murle and Nuer in Jonglei state; and between 
North and South Sudan.
6. We agree that with 102 respondents, our sample is rela-
tively small, however not unusually small. The sample size 
is largely related to the specific target population, that is, 
clerics in Juba. The results need to be interpreted cautiously.
7. We performed two more robustness checks with ethnicity 
(dummy with Dinka vs. other groups) and an interaction 
term of gender and age. Both are insignificant and do not 
alter our other results (see Appendix Tables A8 and A10).
References
Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. 
Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. The Authoritarian 
Personality. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Agwanda, Titus, and Geoff Harris. 2009. “People-to-People 
Peacemaking and Peacebuilding: A Review of the Work 
of the New Sudan Council of Churches.” African Security 
Studies 18 (2): 42–52.
Akbaba, Yasemin, and Zeynep Taydas. 2011. “Does Religious 
Discrimination Promote Dissent? A Quantitative Analysis.” 
Ethnopolitics 10 (3–4): 271–95.
Appleby, Scott. 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: 
Religion, Violence and Reconciliation. Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield.
Basedau, Matthias, Birte Pfeiffer, and Johannes Vüllers. 2014. 
“Bad Religion? Religion, Collective Action and the Onset 
of Armed Conflict in Developing Countries.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution. Published electronically July 23.
Bellair, Paul E., and Thomas L. McNulty. 2009. “Gang 
Membership, Drug Selling, and Violence in Neighborhood 
Context.” Justice Quarterly 26(4):644-669.
Black, David S., Steve Sussmann, and Jennifer B. Unger. 2010. 
“A Further Look at the Intergenerational Transmission of 
Violence: Witnessing Interparental Violence in Emerging 
Adulthood.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 25 (6): 
1022–42.
Breidlid, Ingrid Marie, and Anders Øien Stensland. 2011. 
“The UN Mission and Local Churches in South Sudan: 
Opportunities for Partnerships in Local Peace-Building.” 
Conflict Trends 3 (2011): 33.
Canetti, Daphna, Stevan E. Hobfoll, Ami Pedahzur, and Eran 
Zaidise. 2010. “Much Ado about Religiosity: Heightened 
Support for Political Violence by Failure to Conserve.” 
Journal of Peace Research 45 (5): 575–87.
Davies, James C. 1962. “Toward a Theory of Revolution.” 
American Sociological Review 27:5–19.
De Juan, Alexander. 2009. “A Pact with the Devil? Elite 
Alliances as Bases of Violent Religious Conflicts.” Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (12): 1120–35.
De Juan, Alexander, Jan H. Pierskalla, and Johannes Vüllers. 
2015. “The Pacifying Effects of Local Religious 
Institutions: An Analysis of Communal Violence in 
Indonesia.” Political Research Quarterly 68 (2): 211–24.
Djupe, Paul, and Christopher P. Gilbert. 2003. “The Political 
Voice of Clergy.” Journal of Politics 64 (2): 596–609.
Eisenstein, Marie A. 2006. “Rethinking the Relationship 
between Religion and Political Tolerance.” Political 
Behavior 28 (4): 327–48.
Ellingsen, Tanja. 2000. “Colourful Community or Ethnic 
Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict dur-
ing and after the Cold War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
44 (2): 228–49.
Fox, Jonathan. 2004. Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 
through the New Millennium. Oxford: Lexington Books.
Fox, Jonathan. 2013. An Introduction to Religion and Politics: 
Theory and Practice. London: Routledge.
Fox, Jonathan, Patrick James, and Yitan Li. 2009. “State 
Religion and Discrimination against Ethnic Minorities.” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15 (2): 189–210.
Gubler, Joshua, and Joel Sawat Selway. 2012. “Horizontal 
Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages, and Civil War.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (2): 206–32.
Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
772 Political Research Quarterly 68(4) 
Hirschi, Travis, and Michael J. Hindelang. 1977. “Intelligence 
and Delinquency: A Revisionist Review.” American 
Sociological Review 42 (August): 571–87.
Horowitz, Michael C. 2009. “Long Time Going: Religion and 
the Duration of Crusading.” International Security 34 (2): 
162–93.
Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2008. Global Rebellion. Religious 
Challenges to the Secular State from Christian Militias to 
al Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Koos, Carlo, and Thea Gutschke. 2014. “South Sudan’s Newest 
War: When Two Old Men Divide a Nation.” GIGA Focus 
International Edition English 2014 (2). http://www.
giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_interna-
tional_1402_new.pdf (accessed August 19, 2015).
Latham, Andrew A. 2011. “Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, 
Institutions, and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christen-
dom.” International Studies Quarterly 55 (1): 223–43.
Levitt, Heidi, and Kimberly Ware. 2006. “‘Anything With 
Two Heads Is a Monster’: Religious Leaders’ Perspectives 
on Marital Equality and Domestic Violence.” Violence 
Against Women 2006 12 (12): 1169–90.
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. 
Dynamics of Contention. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Menchik, Jeremy. 2013. “Tolerance without Liberalism. 
Islamic Institutions and Political Violence in 20th Century 
Indonesia.” Unpublished diss., University of Wisconsin–
Madison.
Montalvo, José G., and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. “Ethnic 
Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil War.” American 
Economic Review 95 (3): 796–816.
Hauk, Esther, and Hannes Mueller. 2015. “Cultural Leaders and 
the Clash of Civilizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
59 (3): 367–400.
Pew Research Center. 2012. Religion & Public Life. http://www.
pewforum.org/2012/12/18/table-religious-composition-by-
country-in-percentages (accessed August 19, 2015).
Quinley, Harold. 1974. The Prophetic Clergy—Social Activism 
among Protestant Ministers. New York: John Wiley.
Rokeach, Milton. 1960. The Open and Closed Mind—
Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and 
Personality Systems. New York: Basic Books.
Rothchild, Zachary K., Abdollah Abdolhossein, and Tom 
Pyszczynski. 2009. “Does Peace Have a Prayer? The 
Effect of Mortality Salience, Compassionate Values, 
and Religious Fundamentalism on Hostility toward Out-
Groups.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 
(4): 816–27.
Rummel, Rudolph J. 1997. “Is Collective Violence Correlated 
with Social Pluralism?” Journal of Peace Research 34 (2): 
163–75.
Sherif, Muzafer, O. J. Harvey, B. Jack White, 
William R. Hood, and Carolin W. Sherif. 1961. 
Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave 
Experiment. Vol. 10. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press.
Smock, David, ed. 2002. Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
Svensson, Isak. 2007. “Fighting with Faith: Religion and 
Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51 (6): 930–49.
Toft, Monica Duffy. 2007. “Getting Religion? The Puzzling 
Case of Islam and Civil War.” International Security 31 
(4): 97–131.
Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel 
Shah. 2011. God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global 
Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
Tourangeau, Roger, and Ting Yan. 2007. “Sensitive 
Questions in Surveys.” Psychological Bulletin 133 (5): 
859–83.
Trejo, Guillermo. 2009. “Religious Competition and Ethnic 
Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church 
Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico.” American 
Political Science Review 103 (3): 323–42.
